Roadmap

What we are building next

Keylane is built by a small, self-funded team, so this roadmap is ordered rather than dated. Sequence is a commitment we can keep; delivery dates on cryptographic infrastructure usually are not.

Five groups below: what is already in your hands, what is being worked on now, and three horizons after that. Short term means next; mid term means decided and queued after it; long term means a direction we are keeping the architecture compatible with.

Last reviewed 23 October 2026 · Shipped items move to the changelog

Shipped

Public beta on both stores

Android and iOS clients available to everyone, with no invite required.

Post-quantum key exchange

Hybrid PQXDH combining X25519 with ML-KEM on every conversation.

Phone-number-free identity

Cryptographic identity generated on-device, with no signup of any kind.

Automatic history expiry

Local history and its attachments deleted on a window you choose, from 24 hours to 2 weeks (2 weeks by default), optionally on the other side too.

Voice and video calls

End-to-end encrypted calling, with secure media routing and zero plaintext path on the relay.

No presence or last seen

Keylane never shows anyone whether you are online or when you last were. By design there is nothing to switch on.

Metadata-stripped push

No ciphertext or sender data through Apple or Google push infrastructure.

Additional languages

The app in nine languages: English, Bulgarian, Chinese (Simplified), Italian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Turkish and Ukrainian.

Kodium crypto core, open source

The cryptographic core published under the Apache License 2.0.

Secure notebook

Private notes and credentials kept in the app under the same on-device encryption as your messages, so the secure place you already carry is also the place you write things down.

iPad and Android tablets

A layout made for the big screen, with a sidebar, chats and the conversation side by side, Contact Info beside the chat, and keyboard shortcuts.

Per-chat settings and visible auto-delete

Each chat can keep its own auto-delete window, as short as 1 hour, plus its own media and text settings. The chat shows how long messages are kept and who set it, and turning on deletion from both phones tells your contact.

Reactions and message editing

Emoji reactions that never send a notification, and editing a sent message for up to an hour.

Group chats and media

Groups of up to 50 people, each message encrypted to every member’s device over the same post-quantum ratchet as a one-to-one chat. The server stores no group, no member list and no group key. Photos, files and voice memos are encrypted in groups as everywhere else.

Disappearing messages, enforced by the receiver

With delete for both sides on, each phone deletes the whole chat by itself when the window passes, your contact’s messages and yours, so it holds even when the other phone is offline or gone.

In development

  1. Self-hosted server release

    A packaged container image with installation, hardening, and operational documentation, so that running your own relay is genuinely supportable rather than technically possible. Current status.

  2. Expanded documentation

    Attachments, backup and export, and the remaining client features documented properly. Questions from beta users decide the order.

  3. On-premises deployment

    A supported deployment path for organizations with data-residency obligations, including the operational runbooks that make it defensible in an audit.

  4. Group video chats

    An open video room for each group that any member can join or ignore, with no ringing. The media is end-to-end encrypted with a key from each participant, sent over the group’s existing encrypted sessions.

  5. Interface and experience polish

    Continuous work on the parts of the app you touch daily. Secure and pleasant to use are not a trade we accept.

Short term

The next things we intend to finish. No dates: we would rather ship these late than announce them early.

Independent security audit

A third-party review of the protocol and the implementation. We will publish the report in full, including findings that do not flatter us. Everything else on this page is worth less without it.

Full client source release

The cryptographic core is already public. The remaining client application source is being prepared for release, with reproducible builds as the goal so that a published binary can be checked against published source.

Full federation release

Server-to-server delivery finished and documented, so independent relays interoperate as a matter of course rather than as an experiment.

Emergency codes

A separate code entered instead of your PIN that acts under duress rather than unlocking normally.

Multi-device

One identity across several devices, each with its own key pair, and revocation of a device you no longer hold. A paper recovery key you write down once restores your identity even if the last device holding it is lost or the app is removed. Today a Keylane ID lives on exactly one device. The honest counterpart: paper you keep is paper someone else can take.

Encrypted backup and export

Your conversations and your contact list exported as a locally encrypted file you hold, with the key staying yours, and restored onto a new device without a server ever seeing them.

Server admin console

Operations, federation policy, and abuse handling, with no plaintext path. See it.

Mid term

Decided, and next after the short term: Keylane on more kinds of device, and what organizations need to run it.

Desktop and web clients

Linked desktop and browser clients on the same per-device key model as mobile. Both depend on multi-device landing first.

Open API and libraries

Documented client APIs and libraries for automation and bots, so integrations run on your own identity instead of a privileged back door.

Managed private relay

A dedicated instance operated by us for teams that do not want to run one.

Business features

Organizational directory, provisioning, and administrative controls.

Commercial support

An SLA and a named contact for organizations running their own relay.

Long term

Directions we intend to take Keylane rather than features with a queue position. Listed because the architecture is being kept compatible with them, not because they are close.

Mesh mode without internet

Peer-to-peer delivery over local Wi-Fi and Bluetooth when there is no network to reach a relay — for an outage, a border, or a shutdown.

Small-appliance build

A low-power hardware image for households and small groups.

Not planned

Saying what we will not build is as useful as saying what we will, because each of these would require breaking something on the principles list.

  • Cloud message backup we can read. Server-side history would undo the reason the relay is not worth attacking.
  • Phone number or email accounts. Not even as an optional convenience — an optional identifier is still an identifier we would hold.
  • Advertising or analytics. In the app or on this website.
  • Content scanning of any kind. Including client-side scanning, whatever it is proposed to detect.
  • Lawful-access mechanisms. A backdoor for one party is a vulnerability for everyone.
  • Paid privacy tiers. Security features will not be withheld from free users.

Influence the order

This ordering is our best judgement, not a fixed contract. If something you need is far down the list — or missing — tell us what you are trying to do and why. Beta feedback genuinely moves items.